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    Psychoanalytic and Scientific Reasoning
In daily life we find meaning and motive in the actions of persons (and other animals) naturally,
spontaneously, and continually.   Let us speak of the mental capacities, modes of inference, or ways of
thinking by which we do so as those of interpretation, as Freud did in speaking of the interpretation of
dreams.   We apply our ability to interpret, in this sense, both to passing events or episodes in behaviour,
such as motivated actions and the production of meaningful sentences, and also to lasting results of such
behaviour, such as written texts.
Freud intended psychoanalysis to be an interpretive science.  To many the idea that something is a
matter of interpretation already implies that it cannot be scientific, or even objective, so that this idea
seems paradoxical.  Such a dismissal, however, ignores the fundamental role which interpretation plays in
our lives and understanding generally.  Our interactions with others are mediated by interpretation of their
behaviour, and our fate often depends upon how we do this: for example, on our capacity to detect and
respond to love or hate, friendship or emnity, and many other motives.  Again, it is through interpretation,
taken broadly, that we understand language; and much of  what we know seems registered in language, or
understood through our use of it.   We cannot generally claim a firmer grasp on any of the phenomena we
use langauge to describe than we can on the language which we use describe them; and to use language with
grasp is to use it according to determinable rules, and hence in a way which can be interpreted.  This
indicates that there is a sense in which we understanding nothing better than our own languge, and in that
sense, ourselves.  In this perspective interpretation could be regarded as prior to science; and the limits of
interpretation -- whatever they are -- would  be those of communicable science as well.1
It seems right to say that the pervasive role of interpretation in psychoanlaysis sets it apart from
many other disciplines, and from those which we regard as paradigms of science.  As the above indicates,
however, this does not entail that psychoanalytic hypotheses lack objectivity or empirical support, which
is often the issue in disputes as to whether psychoanalysis is to be regarded as scientific.2  In what follows
I sketch a comparison between interpretive with scientific thinking, which also indicates how
psychoanalytic conclusions might be regarded as well founded.  
             I
Science is an explanatory activity.  In general, we frame scientific theories in order better to
understand data which seem to require or admit explanation; and we accept theories precisely because they
provide the best explanation we can devise of the data which they cover.  Thus if we ask why the ancients
held that the stars were lights on a sphere rotating about the earth, the answer is that they could observe,
and so took as data, the apparent movement of the stars, which they grouped by constellations in the night
sky.  
A person observing the northern skies during a single clear night can follow the paths of the
constellations, and can trace those near the pole star through a rough semi-circle.  Stars further from the
pole also rise and set in ways consistent with the idea that they too follow such orbits, although in this case
the arcs are less noticable.  On the next night, moreeover, the observer can find the stars moving along the
same circles at the same rate, and at just the positions they would have reached if they had continued their
steady revolutions during the intervening day.  The discovery of this constancy in diurnal motion made it
possible to map the stars, and to frame the idea that the motions of the stars are as they would be if the
stars were located on a vast sphere, rotating in relation to the earth.  The hypothesis that the stars were
located on such a sphere thus served to explain their motion (and also to yield an account of the motion of
the sun); and so, in the absence of any better explanation, this hypothesis was a good one to adopt, and was
widely accepted.  
This hypotheses enabled the ancients to keep track of the stars, and to locate themselves and
navigate in relation to them; and it also enabled them to focus upon more subtle celestial data.  For once this
pattern of order was imposed upon celestial motion, the behaviour of a few celestial objects stood out as
anomalous, that is, as not fitting the pattern.  These were therefore distinguished from the rest as
'wanderers', or planets.  As we know, the attempt to explain the movements of the planets led to the
postulation of further spheres, cyclical devices attached to these spheres, and so forth, until Copernicus
realized that the data could be explained more simply on the hypothesis that the earth was not the
stationary center of the observable motions, but rather itself a planet which moved with the others around
the sun.  Following him, again, Kepler realized that the data of apparent motion could be explained with far
greater precision on the hypothesis that the planets moved in elliptical rather than circular orbits,  in such
a way that their paths determined equal areas in the ellipses over equal times.  This more powerful and
accurate specification of order in turn set the stage for Newton, who formulated laws which served to
explain the motion of a vast range of celestial and mundane phenomena, on the basis of the hypothesized
masses of objects and gravitational attraction among them.  These laws, as we know, have only relatively
recently been superceded.3
At each stage in this progress, in this as in other examples of science, we can discern the same
pattern.  Certain phenomena are taken as accepted, or given, and as requiring or admitting explanation.
Hypotheses are framed according to which these data would be as they are, if the hypotheses were true,
and which moreover serve to explain the data, to order them in a way which renders them more
understandable and comprehensible.  Provided the explanation is good, and the best available, we accept it
until it is superceded by another.  Hence we have a continual process of inference to the best explanation.
Using 'D' to represent data and 'H' an explanatory hypothesis, we can schematize this as follows.
Inference to the best explanation:
                      From:  D1...Dn & H (best) explains D1...Dn
          To:  H  
In reasoning in such a way4 we continually gain explanatory advantage, but prove nothing finally.  
New data, including the success of new theories, constantly emerge; what is taken as given at one time - -
the fixity of the earth, the three-dimensionality of space -- may later be rejected in the search for better
explanatory understanding; and however successful and useful a particular theory has proven, this is no
guarantee that it will not be superceded by a better. In this perspective all our hypotheses are provisional
and liable to be revised; but this is no reason not to accept and use them for what they are, that is, the best
explanations we can presently devise.
Since science is a cultural achievement, scientific reasoning tends to be both highly explicit and
potentially transparent.   We deliberately devise our theories to explain certain things, so we can usually
say both what the data relevant to a particular theory are, and how the theory serves to explain them.  In
many cases, however, we use the same mode of reasoning, but without spelling things out fully.  (Thus we
are inclined to accept that correlations between smoking and cancer indicate that the former is a cause of
the latter.  Yet as is often pointed out, correlation is not proof of causation.  What distinguishes the cases in
which we infer causality and those which we do not?  The answer seems to be that in some cases but not
others we hold that the best explanation for the correlation is a causal link.)  Indeed we seem in fact to use
such reasoning in countless commonplace instances, without even considering that explanation is involved.
When we take the ringing of a doorbell to indicate the presence of a caller,  we do not think of ourselves as
explaining the ringing by the best available hypothesis.  But this shows in the fact that if there is no one
there we will be surprised, and then see the ringing as requiring (some further) explanation.
Something similar holds for our interpretive understanding of persons.  Ordinarily, as noted, we
simply see desire or intention in the actions of persons, or hear meaning in the sounds they make in
speaking.   Yet again we can see that this is also an explanatory activity.  Taking others to have certain
desires and intentions, or again to be using words with certain meanings, enables us to understand, or make
sense of, their behaviour; and when we do not understand what persons' motives are, their behaviour
seems a mystery to us, and we want it explained.  So we can also see our practice of  ascribing motive or
meaning to the actions of others as a form of inference to the best explanation, but one in which we engage
naturally, as if innately prepared to do so by evolution.5
          III
Where a mode of thinking is natural to us we are characteristically unaware of the inferences or
transitions of thought which we perform in the course of it.  (Thus for example we are unaware of the way
we impose grammatical categories upon utterances in the course of understanding them.)  Hence we face the
task of making interpretive inference more explicit.  To indicate how we might start to do this, let us
imagine that we watch someone reach out to get a drink, and assume (hypothesize) that she does this
because she saw the drink, wanted it, and so reached for it.  Then the following might be a first rough
attempt to spell out more fully what we take (hypothesize) to be involved.  Using 'A' to name our agent, we
have:
(1)  There is a drink within A's reach.
(2)  A sees that there is  a drink within A's reach.
(3)  A forms the belief that there is a drink within A's reach.
(4)  A forms the belief that if she moves her hand in a certain way then she will get a drink.
(5)  A desires that she get a drink.
(6)  A desires that she move her hand in that way.
(7)  A moves her hand in that way.  
(8)  A gets a drink.
This sequence is deliberately described in a way which is unnaturally complete and explicit. (Thus
we would not ordinarily say that someone desires that she get a drink; but this brings out, as the idiomatic
to get a drink  does not, that the agent's desire is that she, herself, get a drink; and this in turn makes more
explicit the connection between the desire in (5) and the belief in (4) with which it interacts, and between
the same desire and its fulfilment in (8)).  Spelling it out so fully makes clear that we tacitly discern
considerable pattern in it.   We can bring this out by replacing the sentences which articulate the various
desires and beliefs in the sequence by schematic letters.  Then we have:    
(1)  P [there is a drink within A's reach].
(2)  A sees that P [that there is a drink within A's reach]
(3)  A forms the belief that P [that there is a drink within A's reach].
(4)  A forms the belief that if Q then R [that if she moves her hand in a certain way then she will get a
drink]
(5)  A desires that R [that she get a drink]
(6)  A desires that Q [that she moves her hand in that way ]
(7)  Q [A moves her hand in that way].  
(8)  R [A gets a drink].
Clearly this pattern could be discerned in the explanation of many different actions with a similar
underlying structure.  In this we can see our commonsense understanding as involving the patterned
ascription of motives like desire and belief, whose contents we specify in a particular way, that is, by
putting whole indicative sentences (or grammatical variants of these) after psychological terms like
'desires' or 'believes'.  Thus we can speak of desiring, believing, wishing, hoping, fearing, discovering,
forgetting, repressing, phantasying, etc., that P,  where 'P' can be replaced by any of a wide range of
indicative sentences.  
The practice of describing motives in this that P  way is central to psychological understanding.  In
this we as it were re-cycle our sentences for describing the world within the context of psychological
words like 'desires', thereby creating new sentences for describing the mind.   This practice implements
our conception of the mental as having intentionality,  that is, a kind of directedness upon the world; for
any description of this that P  kind perforce represents the mind as engaged with whatever aspect of the
world the embedded worldly sentence 'P' serves to describe.  We can thus use a finite set of psychological
words like 'desires', 'believes', 'hopes', and the like, to form a potential infinity of ascriptions of desire,
belief, hope, etc., which represents these motives as engaged with the world.  Since we can ascribe a
desire that P corresponding to any describable situation which a person might desire, a belief that P
corresponding to any describable situation a person might think obtains, and so forth, this mode of
specification is extraordinarily flexible and precise.  
We also apply the same sort of patterned explanation to actions involving speech.  Thus consider
someone uttering 'The day is warm' because she wants to say that the day is warm.  Here we have:
A desires that P [that she say that the day is warm]
A believes that if Q then P [that if she utters 'The day is warm' she says that the day is warm]
A desires that Q [that she utters 'The day is warm.']      
This, as we can see, involves the same pattern as  (4) - (6) above, with the sentences in a slightly
different order.
The patterns in psychological ascriptions here marked by schematic letters have a notable feature.
They are on the one hand causal, and on the other also correct, rational, or logical.   Thus, speaking
roughly, we can take what we describe by (1) as a cause of what we describe by (2), what we describe by
(2) as cause of what we describe by (3), and so on through the sequence.  For, as we know,  the transition
between (1) and (2) marks the place at which light reflected by objects described in (1) strikes the eyes of
the agent described in (2), and causes the changes in the retina, optic nerve, visual areas of the brain, etc.,
involved in seeing; and perception as described in (2) is a cause of belief, as described in (3); and so on.  
But also the use of the same schematic letter in (1) - (3) indicates that the perception and belief described
there are correct, and correctly formed.   For in describing a perception that P as caused by a situation
that P, we mark that the perception is veridical, that it accurately reflects the situation which it is a
perception of; and in describing the resulting belief as a belief that P we mark that the belief is both true,
as beliefs ought to be, and also caused by the situation which renders it true, and so well grounded.  
Likewise the pattern displayed in (4) - (6) describes a formation of desire in light of belief which is both
causal and rational; and (5) - (8) describe intentional action which is successful, that is, which is not only
caused by  desire, but in which desire is satisfied.  So these patterns, as we can say, are both causal and
normative : they are patterns of causal functioning which are in one way or another correct or as they
should be.
The explanatory sequence in (1) - (8) thus makes use of a number of significant patterns, whcih we
can briefly describe, write,  and label as follows.  These are:
 
(i) A pattern of well-founded belief
B:  P -[causes]-> A bels that P  (cf (1) and (3) above)
(ii)  A pattern of practical reason (the rational formation of desire consequent on belief)
PR:  A des that P & A bels that if Q then P -[causes]-> A des that Q (cf (4) -(6) above)
 (iii) A pattern of the satisfaction of desire:
D: A des that P -[causes]-> P (cf (5) and (8) above)
These patterns, which can be represented in deeper and more detailed ways than sketched here, can
be discerned in intentional action of all kinds.  They seem constitute a part of the underlying 'grammar', or
logical and causal structure, of our natural and intuitive way of understanding one another.  Also, bringing
them out in this way enables us to see how our that P  mode of description of motives makes use of
hermeneutic connections -- connections in sentential description -- to mark motivational causal
connections,  that is, connections between motive and motive, or motive and world, such as are sketched in
(1) - (8).   In these cases, as we can say, relations of linguistic coherence , such as obtains among
sentences filling the P's and Q's in (1) - (8) marks relations of causal coherence,  as between motive and
motive, motive and action, or motive and world generally.6
This is important, because recognizing the way that relations of linguistic coherence map relations
of causal coherence enables to reduce dissonance between hermeneutic and causalist approaches to
interpretation, or to the psychological explanation of behaviour generally.  Schematically, hermeneutic
approaches to these fields emphasize that understanding persons is a matter of finding relations of
meaningful coherence or fit -- as between motive and motive, motive and action, and so forth -- while
causalist approaches emphasize that such cohering factors can serve to explain thought or behaviour only
insofar as they bear upon them causally.7 Each of these claims, it seems, represents a genuine insight into
the nature of interpretive understanding.  Advocates of each, however, have tended to ignore the way in
which we naturally register relations of causal coherence among motives in terms of the kind of relations
of linguistic or logical coherence among our descriptions of these motives which are made explicit in (1) -
(8); hence both have tended to contrast  finding meaning or coherence with discerning causes.  
This has led to dispute in which advocates of each approach reject the insight of the other.
Causalists have tended to deny the explanatory relevance of hermeneutically detected relations of
coherence or fit, while hermeneutic thinkers have tended to deny the causal role of reasons or the
relevance of causality to explanation generally.  What we see in the case of desire, belief, and the like
above, however, is that commonsense interpretive thinking naturally registers causal connection (and
causal coherence) by way of hermeneutic (sentential) coherence.  Hence, and as we shall see in more detail
shortly, the finding of appropriate relations of coherence, or connections in sentential content, can be a
way of supporting causal hypotheses, and hence a way of finding causes.  Thus we can see that both parties
to causalist/hermeneutic disputation are mistaken in their negative claims against one another, while in
their positive claims both are stressing something correct, which, as their dispute indicates, might
otherwise be denied.8
Now to go further into both commonsense and psychoanalytic explanation we must observe that the
working of desire, which we can take as the central motive which we invoke in explaining action, is more
complex than we have so far indicated.  This is because we take it that desire not only prompts (causes)
action, but also ceases to operate in response to the perception that action has been successful.  We take it
that someone who wants a particular drink will, after drinking, realize that she has had the drink she
wanted, and so cease to want it.  (She might now want another  drink, or even to drink that drink again, but
these are different matters.)  Let us describe this by saying that we normally expect that when an agent
satisfies a desire (that is, when A des that P -[causes]-> P), and in consequence believes that this is so
(that is, when P -[causes]-> A bels that P), then this results in the pacification  of the agent's desire (that
is, that A's des that P is pacified.)  So, abbreviating as above, we have
(iv) A fuller pattern of the role of desire in commonsense psychological explanation, including the
pacification (ceasing of operation) of desire, produced by belief in the satisfaction of desire.
D*  A des that P -[causes]-> P -[causes]-> A bel that P -[causes]-> A's des that P is pacified.
This pattern D* represents, as it were, the life-cycle of a single desire in successful intentional
action.  (It clearly contains within itself both D (the pattern of the satisfaction of desire) and B (the
pattern of well-founded belief) above.)  And again, this is an explanatory pattern which we can think of
ourselves as applying to actions as we watch them unfold.  Thus we might have watched our agent above
notice the drink, and guessed from the way she looked that she would drink it.  This, in effect, would
constitute a hypothesis that the sequence described in (1) - (3) had already take place, and that the
sequence described in (5) - (8) was about to unfold.   
The sequence described in (5) and (8), in turn, involves the further complexity discerned in the
appropriate version of D*.  In thinking that a person, A, is (intentionally) going to get a drink, we in effect
frame a predictive hypothesis,  which could be put into words by using the sentence 'A gets a drink' in al l
four positions in an instance of D*.  We think, that is, that A desires that A get a drink, and we predict
first  that this will result in A moving her body in such a way that she gets a drink, secondly  that she w i l l
come to believe that she has done so, and thirdly  that this will pacify her desire, so that she turns to
something else.  (Of course, again, we do not formulate such predictions, or anything like D * , explicitly to
ourselves.  But that we make such predictions shows in the ways in which we would be surprised if the
agent's action unfolded differently from the way we expect.)9
As this example suggests, our tacit explanatory and predictive use of patterns like B , P R , and D *
is far more frequent and complex than we are aware.  Indeed we commonly see intentional actions as
informed by very many more desires and beliefs than we can perspicuously represent by listing the desires
and beliefs in instances of PR as we did in (5) - (8) or the case of the speech-act of saying that the day
was warm considered above.  We can, however,  begin  to show some of the complexity involved by making
use of another sort of diagram, of a kind familiar from linguistics.  Thus for the explanation of the speech-
act above, we have
A says that the day is warm
  A utters 'The day is warm' 
A utters 'The'  A utters 'day'   A utters 'is'   A utters 'warm'
   [[M1 M2  M3]   [Mn Mn+1 Mn+2]   [Mo Mo+1]  [Mp Mp+1....]]
  
We can display the structure of our hypotheses about an agent's goals in action, or again the
constituent structure of the goals, or of the action itself, by a tree diagram, which grows down through a
series of branching nodes.  (Trees of this kind as it were have an aerial root.)   Such a tree will have an
agent's overall goal in acting at the top (root), and will grow down from this goal through the ordered
series of other goals which the agent takes as requisite to secure the root motive.  We can take each of
these subordinate goals to give rise to a further tree of the same kind, until we reach goals which are
simply the performing of various desired bodily movements in sequence, which we can label by M1, M2,
etc.
In this way we can indicate the overall structure of actions or projects approaching everyday
complexity, such as getting cash from a till.
A gets cash
 A inserts card  A enters number  A enters amount  A takes card  A takes cash
A enters '1' etc.    A enters '5' etc.
[[M1  M2............]  [Mn Mn+1..][.........][.....M.........M.....................[.......][M....Mx]]
   This kind of representation is intuitively fairly clear, but let us spell out what is involved a little
more fully.  Suppose we have a goal G connected by branches to sub-goals G1 to Gn, and these by further
branches to further sub-goals G1,1, G1,2, etc., as in the following:
                
G
G1  G2 ......Gn
G1,1  G1,2  etc.
Here the top tree corresponds to a desire that G and a belief that if G1 and G2 and... Gn (in that
order) then G.  This tree constitutes a complex instance of P R , as does the tree down from G1, which
corresponds to a desire that G1 and a belief that if G1,1.... then G1; and so on down the tree. When we
spontaneously interpret an agent's movements in terms of intentions and reasons, we tacitly relate these
movements to such a tree, or to a series of such trees.  (Ordinarily we do not fill these out consciously, but
if pressed we can do so in more or less detail; and in this we are not introducing further hypotheses, but
making explicit what we already tacitly took to be the case.)   
Each tree relates the sentence at its root to a sequence of hypothesised effects, which, if all goes
correctly,  should also ultimately be describable as a bringing about of the situation, and thence of the
belief, and thence of the pacification of the desire,  described by that same root sentence.  The same holds
for each subsidiary sentence likewise, and in the order marked by the tree.  The whole hypothesis thus
fixes for each goal for each intentional movement by which that goal is executed a place in a determinate
order of satisfaction and pacification.   This imposes a complex bracketing or phrasing on behaviour, which
segments the flow of movement upon which the hypotheses is directed into the series of units and
sequences, groups and subgroups, which we perceive as the unfolding rhythm of intention in action.  The
whole, moreover, can be seen as consisting of iterations of simpler parts which correspond to each aspect
of this segmentation, that is, instances of D* governed by instances of P R .  So we can see each goal-
specifying sentence in a tree as applied repeatedly, now to articulate a motive as hypothesis, now to
describe predicted (or cohering) effects of that motive as test, as in the simple case spelt out above.  In
such a tree, therefore, we find the basic normative and hypothetical structure of D* both repeatedly and in
the large.  
 We can thus see our commonsense practice of intepretation as one in which we tacitly and
intuitively hypothesize such tree-like structures of motive as explaining both speech and action.   The
patterns specified in such trees therefore have an epistemic status which is worth noting. We interpret
behaviour in accord with them naturally, and hence spontaneously, rapidly, and continually.  In this sense
we use them more frequently, and rely on them more deeply, than any generalizations of science. (But of
course we have no need to realize that this is so.)  We learn such patterns together with language, so that
their use is in a sense a priori.  Also, however, we find them instantiated, and hence supported in a way
which is both empirical and a posteriori, in instances of successful interpretive understanding too dense and
numerous to register.  The role of causality in the patterns makes clear that our interpretive practice is an
empirical and causal one, and the role of sentences in them indicates how motivational causality is caught in
the net of language.  For in using these patterns, each of us in effect systematically maps the sentences of
his or her own  idiolect on to the utterances and actions, and thence on to the mind, of the other.
This in turn provides a further key to the power and accuracy of this mode of understanding.   For
each of us has both  a natural ability to interpret others and  a natural ability to put his or her own motives
(very many of them, at least) accurately into words.  (In philosophy this is referred to as first-person
authority.)  This means that we can tacitly check our understanding of a person's non-verbal actions against
our understanding of that same person's speech-acts; and it seems that we constantly do this, and that it i s
a powerful source of checking and confirmation for our intuitive understanding of others.  Thus, to take the
simplest possible kind of case, suppose that I have an hypothesis as to what motives you are acting on, and
also hypotheses about what the sentences (series of sounds) in your idiolect mean.  Let us assume that in
communicating with me you say things (make sounds) which, according to my understanding of your
idiolect, expresses motives which accord with my hypotheses about your actions.  Then, questions of
sincerity aside, this tends to show that my hypothesis about both  the meanings of your sentences and the
motives upon which you act are correct, and also that you have the ability to express your motives in
speech accurately.  Hence insofar as we take it that this could be done for each of my interpretations of
your non-verbal actions, we assume that my degree of confidence in my interpretation of your actions can
approach whatever degree I assign to your ability to put your motives into words; and also that whatever
intuitive confirmation I have for those interpretations can be made to count also in favour of my
understanding of your idiolect.   The same of course holds as regards your interpretations of my actions and
speech.  So it seems that if each of us is able to cross-check the interpretation of action against speech, and
also to provide speech as well as action for others to cross-check likewise, then we may come to
understand one another really well.  
In this process we do not simply rely upon one another's ability to interpret, or to express motives
accurately; rather we constantly test, confirm, and refine these abilities, by cross-checking the
intepretation of verbal and non-verbal action.  Thus, insofar each of us is both a potentially accurate
interpreter of others, and also capable of accurate expression of our own motives in speech, we can come
understand one another with constantly increasing accuracy, which is also increasingly well confirmed.10
         IV  
This sketch of our commonsense practice of interpretation is of course only fragmentary,  but it
suggests that interpretation proceeds most surely where an interpreter can match his or her own account
of an interpretee's motives with the interpretee's own expression of these motives in speech.  These
theoretically ideal conditions for interpretation are in fact actually approximated in psychoanalytic
therapy.  Here an  interpretee (analysand) provides an interpreter (analyst) with the fullest possible verbal
specification of the motives which both are seeking to understand.  Also the analysand engages in free
association,  reporting the contents of consciousness as they occur, without seeking to censor them, or to
render them logical or sensible. This enables the analyst to frame hypotheses (interpretations) as to
further motives on the part of the analysand, which both can then consider on the basis of the maximum of
shared relevant data.
Above we discussed the everyday practice of the explanation of action by reference to desires
(goals) and beliefs.  As is familiar, psychoanalysis extends this practice by relating dreams, symptoms,
and other phenomena to desires or goals as well.  The nature of this extension can partly be seen in very
simple examples.  Thus Freud found that when he had eaten anchovies or some other salty food, he was
liable to have a dream that he was drinking cool delicious water.  After having this dream, or a series of
such dreams, Freud would awake, find himself thirsty, and get a drink.  Probably many people have had this
dream, or its counterpart concerning urination.  And anyone who has such a dream will naturally regard it
as a wishfulfilment  in Freud's sense; that is, as (i) caused by, and (ii) representing the satisfaction of, the
desire to drink felt on waking.  
This natural reasoning is clearly cogent; and it turns upon the fact that the dreamer's desire is so
clearly and closely related in  sentential content  to the dream.  This is more or less obvious, but let us
spell it out.  The dreamer's desire is for a certain sort of situation (that in which the dreamer has a drink),
and the dream represents that situation as real (the dreamer is having a drink). To put the point
schematically, the dreamer's desire is that P, and the dream is that P, and this striking similarity gives
good reason to suppose that the desire brought about the dream. Also it seems that such a dream has a
pacifying influence --  perhaps only a fleeting one -- on the desire which prompts it.  The dream-experience
of drinking seems to provide a form of temporary relief or check on the underlying thirst, the insufficiency
of which is indicated by the dreamer's waking to get a real drink.
Such an account assimilates the dream to wishful thinking or imagining, and this, and its role in the
pacification of desire, are also familiar.  We are aware in many other cases that our response to a desire or
wish that P is in one way or another to imagine, suppose, or make believe that P (or something related to P)
is the case.  We know that people day-dream in this way regularly, and often more or less deliberately; and
such episodes of imagining may give pleasure, and seem partly to pacify the desires which they represent
as fulfilled.  The same applies to the kind of make-believe found in children's play, or again to the
suspension of disbelief or imaginative immersion involved in the theatre, cinema, video games, and the like.
In these and many other cases, it seems, people make use of forms of imaginative representation to pacify
desires which they cannot or would not actually satisfy by representations of their satisfaction.  In using
imaginative representation in this way, moreover, people regularly falsify reality -- represent things as
other than they are -- in two connected ways.  They misrepresent the state of their own mind  in
representing themselves as experiencing the satisfaction of some desire which, in fact, remains frustrated.
And they misrepresent the state of their own activity, in representing themselves as satisfying a
particular desire, while in fact they are at best pacifying that desire with a false representation of its
satisfaction.  (The dreamer represents himself as actually drinking, while in fact he is only dreaming of
doing so.)
 Above we described intentional actions as sharing a common schematic pattern; and we can see
that the episodes of wishful imagining we are now considering share a common pattern as well.  In all these
cases a desire (or wish) that P leads to a form of imagining or making-believe that P, which in one way or
another serves (perhaps only partly or incompletely) to pacify the desire.11  If we call the kind of belief- or
experience-like representation involved in such cases 'b-representation', then we can write their common
pattern as:  
    wff: A des (wish) that P -[causes]->A b-reps that P -[causes]-> A's des (wish) that P is pacified.
This pattern is evidently closely related to D* above.  Both are patterns in which desire is pacified, and via
representation; for belief, as it figures in D* can be taken as the limiting case of belief-like representation
which figures in wff.  The kinship shows in the fact that wff can be regarded as a version of D *  in which
the role of reality is left out, so that an instance of wff can be seen as a short-circuiting of an instance of
D*.  In the example of drinking by which we illustrated D* above, the agent's desire produced a real action
resulting in a real drink, and thence in a pacifying belief that she was drinking.  In a dream of drinking, by
contrast, the mind (or brain) by-passes the path through reality which might result in real satisfaction, and
produces the pacifying representation directly and by itself.  This shows in that fact that w f f  is like D *
except for the omission of  '-[causes]-> P -[causes]->'; that is, except for the production of the real action
which satisfies desire and renders pacifying belief veridical.
Since we are already familiar with many ways in which people use forms of imaginative
representation to pacify their desires, pattern wff appears to be one which we already tacitly use and
understand, even if we rarely make it explicit.  And it is certainly intelligible that such a pattern should
exist, and that it should be so closely related to that of action.  For, as D *  already makes clear, action i s
aimed not only at satisfaction, but also at the pacification of desire; and in successful action the mind (or
brain) achieves this pacification by way of belief, that is, by way of representation.  Since such
representation is the key to pacification in the case of successful action, it is not surprising that a related
form of representation --  familiar in various forms of imagination, make-believe, suspension of disbelief,
and the like --  should also play a role in pacifying desire and motives related to it.  Human desire far
outruns the possibilities of successful action.   So it is natural that desire should admit of pacification by
other means, and that there should be forms of desire, or motives related to desire, which are
characteristically pacified  by representation alone.      
To see something of the role of wff in psychoanalytic interpretation let us consider the example
with which Freud begins The Interpretation of Dreams, his own dream of Irma's injection.12  In this dream
Freud met Irma, a family friend and patient, whom he had diagnosed as hysterical and treated by an early
version of psychoanalysis.  He told Irma that if she still felt pains, this was her own fault, for not accepting
his 'solution' to her difficulties.  As she continued to complain, however, he became alarmed that she was
suffering from an organic illness which he had failed to diagnose, and this turned out to be so. Freud
examined Irma, and then she was examined by some of Freud's colleagues, including his senior colleague M ;
and it became manifest not only that she was organically ill, but also that her illness was caused by a toxic
injection given by another of Freud's colleagues, his family doctor Otto.  Thus he sets out the parts of the
dream with which we shall be concerned as follows:
....numerous guests, among them Irma.  I at once took her on one side, as though to answer
her letter and to reproach her for not having accepted my 'solution' yet.  I said to her 'If
you still get pains, it' really only your fault.'  She replied: 'If you only knew what pains I've
got now in my throat and stomach and abdomen --it's choking me' -- I was alarmed and
looked at her....I thought to myself that after all I must be missing some organic trouble....I
at once called in Dr. M.., and he repeated the examination and confirmed it...M. said 'There's
no doubt it's an infection, but no matter; dysentery will supervene and the toxin will be
eliminated.'...We were directly aware, too, of the origin of the infection.  Not long before,
when she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection....Injections of that
sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly...And probably the syringe had not been clean. (IV
107)
Unlike the simple dream of drinking this dream does not appear to be wish-fulfilling: in fact it dealt
with topics which were not pleasant to Freud.  It concerned the continued suffering of a patient who was
also a family friend, and for whom, therefore, the question of his responsibility was particularly acute; and
also about the possibility that he had misdiagnosed an organic illness as hysteria, which he described as 'a
constant anxiety' to someone offering psychological treatment.  But Freud systematically collected his free
associations -- the thoughts, feelings, etc., which occurred to him -- in connection with each element of the
dream; and in light of these we can that the treatment of these topics in the dream is in fact wishful, and in
a way which is radical.
The topics of the dream had arisen on the day before.  Otto had just returned from visiting Irma and
her family, and had briefly discussed Irma with Freud, commenting that she was looking 'better, but not yet
well'.  Freud had felt something like a reproof in this, as though he had held out too much hope that Irma
might be cured; and in consequence he regarded the remark as thoughtless, and felt annoyed with Otto.
(Also, as it happened, Otto had been called on to give someone an injection while at Irma's  -- cf the topic of
the dream -- and Freud had just had news indicating, as he thought, that another of his female patients had
been given a careless injection by some other doctor, and had been contemplating his own careful practice
in this respect with a degree of self-satisfaction.) That night, in order to justify himself, Freud had started
to write up Irma's case to show to M, who was respected by both himself and Otto, and who appeared in the
dream as diagnosing Irma's illness and becoming aware that it was Otto's fault.  
In considering the dream Freud noted that his desire to justify himself in respect of Irma's case,
and in particular not to be responsible for her suffering, was apparent from the beginning, in which he told
Irma that her pains were now her own fault. Also, he felt that his alarm at her illness in the dream was not
entirely genuine. So, as Freud realised, it seemed that he was actually wishing that Irma be organically i l l :
for as he undertook to treat only psychological complaints, this also would mean that he could not be held
responsible for her condition, by Otto or anyone else.  This theme, indeed, seemed carried further in the
rest of the dream, in which M found that Otto, not Freud, bore responsibility for Irma's illness. The whole
dream, in fact, could be seen as a wishful response to Otto's remark.  According to the dream, and contrary
to what Freud had taken Otto to imply, Freud bore no responsibility whatever for Irma's condition.  Rather,
Otto was the sole cause of her suffering, and this was a result of Otto's bad practice with injections, a
matter about which Freud himself was particularly careful.    
The contrasting role of desire in action and wishfulfilment shows here particularly clearly.  Freud's
intentional action in response to his desire to be cleared of culpable responsibility was to write up a case
history to show to his respected senior colleague M., whose authoritative judgement might serve to clear
him.  This is an action in potential accord with pattern PR, and so also with D * .  His dream apparently
shows the same motive at work, but in a very different way.  There the desire to be cleared produced no
rational action, but rather gave rise directly to a (dreamt) belief-like representation of a situation in which
Freud was cleared of responsibility in a whole variety of ways, some involving M.  These are instances of
b-representation produced in accord with pattern wff.
We can think of the process by which we specify these instances, and thus represent the material of
a dream in terms of pattern wff, as follows.  The dreamer's free associations, which range over intimate
details of his or her life and thought,  give information about incidents and emotions (Otto's giving someone
an injection while at Irma's, his remark about Irma, Freud's annoyance, etc.) which appear to have
influenced the content of the dream.  These apparent connections between associations and dream are data
which require to be explained.  The explanation needed is one which specifies how the material from the
associations is causally related to the content of the dream.
Inspection of Freud's dream and his associations reveals many such apparent connections.  We might
start in a preliminary way to list some we have considered as follows:
  From the Associations           From the Dream
Freud wants not to be responsible
for Irma's suffering.
Freud says to Irma 'If you still get
pains, its really only your fault.
Freud wants not to be responsible
for Irma's suffering.
Irma is suffering from an organic
complaint, for the treatment of
which Freud is not responsible.
Freud is annoyed with Otto, for his
remark implying that Freud was i n
some way at fault in his practice
with Irma.
Otto is at fault in his practice with
Irma.
Otto had given someone an injection
while at Irma's, and Freud has been
contemplating that his injections
never cause infection.
Otto gave Irma an injection which
caused an infection.
Freud desires to clear himself of
respons ib i l i ty  fo r  I rma 's
suffering.
Otto bears sole responsibility for
Irma's suffering.
Freud was hoping that M's opinion
of his treatment of Irma would
clear him of responsibility.
M observes Otto's bad practice and
recognises that Otto bears fu l l
respons ib i l i ty  fo r  I rma 's
suffering.
Freud considered Otto's remark to
him thoughtless.
Otto's injection of Irma was
thoughtless.
This list is incomplete but illustrative. It seems hard to deny that the relation of elements on the
left to those on the right requires explanation in terms of a causal connection.  This being so, the question
arises as to what kind of causal hypothesis would provide the best explanation.  Freud's hypothesis is in
effect that these data are linked by wishful imaginative representation, and hence in accord with pattern
wff.  We can represent this hypothesis in relation to the data as follows.
  From the Associations Hypothesis: that material
from associations and
dream is linked by wishful
imaginative  representation
and so in accord with wff.
          From the Dream




Irma's suffering as not his
fault, but her own.
Freud says to Irma 'If you
still get pains, its really
only your fault.




Irma as suffering from
something for which he is
not responsible.
Irma is suffering from an
organic complaint, for the
treatment of which Freud i s
not responsible.
Freud is annoyed with Otto,
for his remark implying
that Freud was in some way
at fault in his practice with
Irma.
Freud wishfully represents
the situation as the reverse
of that implied by Otto, so
that it is Otto, not Freud
himself, who can be accused
of fault connected with
Irma's suffering.
Otto is at fault in his
practice with Irma.
Otto had given someone an
injection while at Irma's,




Freud uses elements from
rea l i ty  to  wishfully
represent the situation as
one in which Otto, not Freud
himself, should be accused
of fault connected with
Irma's suffering.
Otto gave Irma an injection
which caused an infection.




the situation as one i n
wh ich  he  has  no
responsibility for Irma's
suffering.
O t t o  b e a r s  s o l e
responsibility for Irma's
suffering.
Freud was hoping that M's
opinion of his treatment of
Irma would clear him of
responsibility.
Freud wishfully represents
M as finding that Irma's
suffering was Otto's fault.
M observes Otto's bad
practice and recognises that




remark to him thoughtless.
Freud wishfully represents
Otto as thoughtless.
Otto's injection of Irma was
thoughtless.
Now this table represents only a fraction of the data from the association and dream which bear on
the hypotheses advanced in it; but examination of further data will also be found to fit together with these.
Freud's interpretation thus serves to explain data which are clearly discernible, by bringing them under an
hypothesis whose pattern is represented by w f f .  The application of this pattern, however,  carries a
commitment to a range of hitherto unacknowledged mental states and processes.  The processes are those
of the wishful imagining which give rise to the manifest content of dreams; and the states are those desire-
like states which give rise to the wishful imagining, and which, therefore, we call wishes, but in a
theoretical and extended sense.  These here include Freud's wishing that Irma's suffering be her own fault,
that it be organic, that it be Otto's rather than Freud's responsibility, etc.  Thus in Freud's conception a
dream-wish is an entity introduced by hypothesis, to account for an episode of apparently wishful imagining
(or pacifying representation more generally).  Such wishes stand to the process of wishful imagining
manifest in a dream, day-dream, etc., partly as desires stand to the actions they are cited to explain.
Hence just as a desire can be read in part from the intentional action which the desire is hypothesised to
explain,  so the wish can be read in part from the episode of imagining -- from the dream or day-dream - -
which it is hypothesised to explain; and just as the action serves to pacify the desire, so, apparently, the
imagining serves to pacify this wish.
This indicates that the wishes introduced in the psychoanalytic explanation of dreams in accord with
wff are comparable, from a methodological perspective, to the desires introduced in the explanation of
action in accord with D*. In particular, we can see that psychoanalytic hypotheses admit of testing, and
hence of confirmation, in the same sort of way as those advanced in the commonsense explanation of action,
which in general we regard as capable of a high degree of cogency.  In this case, however, the hypotheses
concern motives (dream wishes) of a kind which are capable of explaining phenomena which are unexplained
in commonsense psychology, and whose contents are different and more extreme.  
We can mark this difference by noting that the wishes which Freud has here uncovered -- even in
this most superficial layer of interpretation -- already stand in striking contrast to motives standardly
acknowledged in waking life. By everyday standards, for example, these wishes are highly egoistic,
ruthless, and extreme.  We should regard someone who acted on desires  with these contents -- who to
escape an imagined reproach arranged for a friend and patient to be seriously ill, and for revenge threw the
blame for this on another friend, the author of the supposed reproach -- as  criminal or worse. Likewise the
way of thinking shown in the dream is radically defective: the reversal of Otto's reproach, for example,
seems like a transparently childish 'It's not me  that's bad -- it's you.' (Projection)  Also, the dream-
wishes are sharply at variance with Freud's other motives, so that the representation of their fulfilment
seems alarming rather than pleasant, and the acknowledgement of them, even as mere dream-wishes, is not
entirely easy.  Thus take the wish that Irma be physically ill.  Since she was Freud's friend and patient, this
would have been a source of considerable distress in real life; and the situation was one of some alarm in
the dream. Accordingly in acknowledging the wish Freud says that he 'had a sense of awkwardness at having
invented such a severe illness for Irma simply in order to clear myself.  It looked so cruel...'  So even in
this first example, we begin to find a significant extension of commonsense psychology.
And clearly, even in this first example,  the extension goes further.  We have been considering
Freud's dream in relation to events of the day before, and his apparent wishes (i) not to be responsible for
Irma's suffering and (ii) to turn the tables on his imagined accuser Otto.  But it is clear from Freud's
associations that the dream also related to deeper matters of responsibility, and in particular to Freud's
role in the death of one of his patients, and one of his friends.  Thus he associated as follows to the element
of the dream in which he called in Dr. M to examine Irma.
I at once called in Dr. M., and he repeated the examination....This reminded me of a tragic
event in my practice.  I had on one occasion produced a severe toxic state in a woman
patient by repeatedly prescribing what was at that time regarded as a harmless remedy
(sulphanol), and had hurriedly turned for assistance and support to my experienced senior
colleague...My patient -- who succumbed to the poison -- had the same name as my eldest
daughter...Mathilde...(IV 111,112)
This touches also on the theme of thoughtless medication, which was also connected with the death
of one of Freud's friends, as well as some lesser matters, which, however, also seem likely causes of guilt.
As Freud introduces this topic:
What I saw in her throat: a white patch and turbinal bones with scabs on them....I was
making frequent use of cocaine at that time to relieve some troublesome nasal swellings,
and I had heard a few days earlier that one of my women patients who had followed my
example had developed an extensive necrosis [area of dead tissue] of the nasal mucous
membrane.  I had been the first to recommend the [medical] use of cocaine, in 1885, and
this recommendation had brought serious reproaches down on me.  The misuse of that drug
had hastened the death of a dear friend of mine...I had advised him to use the drug internally
[i.e. orally] only, while morphia was being withdrawn; but he had at once given himself
cocaine injections. (IV 111, 115)
So the figure of Irma in the dream was linked in Freud's mind with that of three persons to whom he
had done some damage in his medical interventions, including two who had actually died as a result of them.
These cases are apparently alluded to in the dream in a number of ways, for example in M's statement
above that 'the toxin will be eliminated.'  Their role becomes clearer if we consider Freud's  associations to
the final elements of the dream, which were quoted above.
Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly.  Here an accusation of
thoughtlessness was being made directly against my friend Otto. I seemed to remember
thinking something of the same kind that afternoon when his words and looks had appeared
to show that he was siding against me.  It had been some such notion as: 'How easily his
thoughts are influenced!  How thoughtlessly he jumps to conclusions!' -- Apart from this,
this sentence in the dream reminded me once more of my dead friend who had so hastily
resorted to cocaine injections....I noticed too that in accusing Otto of thoughtlessness in
handling chemical substances I was once more touching upon the story of the unfortunate
Mathilde, which gave grounds for the same accusation against myself...
And probably the syringe had not been clean :  This was yet another accusation against
Otto, but derived from a different source.  I had happened the day before to meet the son of
an old lady of eighty-two, to whom I had to give an injection of morphia twice a day.  At the
moment she was in the country and he told me that she was suffering from phlebitis.  I had
at once thought it must be an infiltration caused by a dirty syringe.  I was proud of the fact
that in two years I had not caused a single infiltration; I took constant pains to be sure that
the syringe was clean.  In short: I was conscientious. (IV 117,118)
Thus on examination, Freud's associations indicate further apparently non-coincidental connections
with his dream, which we can represent as follows:
From the Associations From the Dream
Freud accidentally caused the death
of a patient by prescribing her a
toxic substance.
Otto misuses toxic substances.
Freud advised a friend to take
cocaine, and the friend's death was
hastened by cocaine injections.  
Freud reproaches Otto with the
thought that injections of that kind
ought not be made so thoughtlessly.
It seems clear that, just as Freud wished to avoid culpable responsibility for Irma's suffering, so he
might well have wished that he could avoid such responsibility in these cases as well.  So applying Freud's
form of hypothesis to this data, we have:





the death of a patient by
prescribing her a toxic
substance.
Freud wishfully represents
Otto rather than himself as
responsible for the misuse
of toxic substances, as in
the case of the patient
whose death he caused.
Otto  m isuses  toxic
substances.
Freud advised a friend to
take cocaine, and the
friend's  death was hastened
by cocaine injections.
Freud wishfully represents
Otto rather than himself as
responsible for thoughtless
injections, as were given i n
the case of his friend who
died.
Freud reproaches Otto with
the thought that injections
of that kind ought not be
made so thoughtlessly.
These hypotheses are deeper than those than those which touch merely on the day before the dream
and the figure of Irma herself.  They involve further figures,  the more distant past, and deeper emotions.
What Freud took to be in question in Otto's remark was responsibility for Irma's continued neurotic
suffering.  What was in question in the case of his friend and patient, however, was responsibility of a
graver kind: that for causing death.  Hence the deeper emotion involved is guilt. This  is coherent with the
wish not to be responsible for Irma's suffering shown more explicitly in the dream; for although Freud does
not make the point explicit, this too would be a source of guilt.  
To accept these further hypotheses, therefore, is to see the dream as wishfully related not only to
persons and events of the day before the dream, but also to persons and events from the past.  To put the
point in terms of some of Freud's theoretical terminology: in these hypotheses the image of Irma in the
dream is seen as a condensation, involving not only Irma herself, but also the friend and patient from the
past, in whose cases Freud would like to be free of guilt; and the dream effects a wishful displacement  of
the kind of guilt Freud felt in respect of these cases too on to the figure of Otto. The dream is thus shaped
by persons and events from the past, which are linked in the mind of the dreamer with those from the day
before, but have a deeper emotional significance.   
In seeing the dream in this way, moreover, we also have reason to see Freud's conscious feelings
and actions in a different light.  For we can now see, for example, that Freud was so sensitive to Otto's
remark, and so ready to regard Otto as thoughtless, because Otto's remark touched upon issues of medical
responsibility which were particularly significant for Freud, even though he was not aware of them at the
time, and would not have become aware of them had he not analysed the dream.  (Likewise for Freud's
action of writing up Irma's case history, his contemplation of his own care with respect to injections, and
so forth.)  The point is not that these thoughts, feelings, and actions are not to be seen as Freud consciously
represents them; it is rather that the dream and associations indicate that they are also to be seen in
another way, that is, as related to the past, and to guilt, in ways the conscious representation alone tells
us nothing of.
       V
Although our discussion has touched on only a few of the relevant topics13, it suggests that we can
see Freud's reasoning in this paradigmatic example as a form of inference to the best explanation, and hence
as acceptable, and of the same kind we find in science generally.  Also, we can see that the kind of
extension of commonsense psychology set in train by Freud's reasoning in this example is potentially
radical, cumulative, and sound.  Radical, because the interpretation of dreams (or other wishfulfilments)
evidently leads very rapidly to the ascription of wishes very different from those acknowledged in
everyday life, and also to the discernment of new mental mechanisms, new kinds of dependency of present
mental life on the past, and so forth.  Cumulative, because the kinds of wishes we can discern in a dream
depend upon the desires we take people to have in waking life, and our hypotheses about these, as we have
just seen, tend to be strikingly enriched as a result of considering dreams.  So the discovery of dream-
wishes might lead to further hypotheses about waking motives, and these to the finding of further dream
wishes, and so on, in rapid succession. (Something of this may be visible in Freud's consideration of the
Oedipus Complex in The Interpretation of Dreams.)  Finally, even such a radical and cumulative extension
might be sound, in the sense that each further hypothesis about new wishes, desires, etc., might be
thoroughly cross-checked via the interpretation of very many dreams (or other wishfulments) and verbal
and non-verbal actions, and hence be intuitively confirmed to a high degree.  Freud and his successors have
in effect claimed that this is so.  The argument here suggest that while this would be very difficult to
demonstrate, it might nonetheless be true.   An interpretive science, as one might say, would certainly not
seem like a science, for it would be an enterprise in which the tacit and intuitive testing of hypotheses
would perpetually outrun our capacities to make the relevant data, claims, and inferences fully explicit and
communicable.  Whether we choose to call psychoanalysis a science or not, it seems to be such a case.
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water she pours it on the flowers) so that we conclude that we were wrong about her desire (we were
wrong about the sentence 'P' in des P); (ii) an agent may try to do what we did expect but fail (des P was
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12    Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Edition of the Collected Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud   (London: Hogarth, 1974) Vol IV, pp 104ff.
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